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Transaction Costs and Institutional Innovations in Agricultural Labor Contracts  
 
 
Abstract.  This paper develops and econometrically tests a model of labor contractual choice in 
developing countries, focusing on the choice between directly hiring labor on a spot market 
versus reliance on labor contractors.  The theoretical model examines the role of market prices 
and factor endowments on contract choice and the role of labor contracting as an institutional 
innovation to reduce transactions costs associated with the use of hired labor. Econometric 
results confirm hypotheses that contracting becomes more profitable as farm size and collateral 
ownership increase, as family size decreases, and with tightening of the casual labor market. 
 
Introduction 
This paper develops and applies a framework to analyze the impacts of transactions costs on 
agricultural production and on employer choice between labor contracts.  In particular, the paper  
focuses on employer choice between two types of labor arrangements: the direct hiring of labor 
via the casual market versus employing the services of an independent labor contractor who 
recruits and monitors the work team.  The basic thesis is that employer choice of labor 
contracting is determined as the result of a tradeoff between two sets of costs attendant to hired 
labor contracts: the cost of working capital necessary for direct monetary payments to labor and 
employer time costs of labor recruitment and supervision. Hiring labor from the spot or “casual” 
labor market entails a number of transactions costs in terms of employer time to recruit the work 
force, negotiate contracts, coordinate the production process and monitor the quality and amount 
of labor effort supplied by hired hands.  Casually hired labor is costly in terms of the opportunity 
cost of employer time, which must be diverted from directly productive activities to managerial 
ones. Use of contract labor involves greater monetary costs but requires less employer time than 
do casual labor.  Employer choice of labor arrangement thus depends not only on market prices 
and technology, but also on employer endowments of working capital and available time.   
  The paper is organized as follows. In Part 1, following Sen (1981) and Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1986), two perturbations are introduced into a standard profit function. The availability and cost   2
of credit depend on borrower ability to offer collateral and hiring labor on the spot market entails 
transactions costs in terms of employer time. Transactions costs impose a number of constraints 
on production and explain certain stylized facts in Indian agriculture. In Part 2, labor contracting 
is modeled as an institutional innovation that allows employers to economize on time costs. By 
substituting working capital for time, reliance on labor contractors allows employers to 
circumvent managerial diseconomies. In the model, contracting increases responsiveness of labor 
demand and output supply to market prices and increases labor demand on large farms.  Labor 
contracting becomes more profitable as farm size and collateral ownership increase, as family 
size decreases, and with tightening of the casual labor market. Contracting is also more profitable 
for tasks that require the application of large amounts of labor over a short time horizon. In Part 
3, an econometric model of contractual choice is developed to test hypotheses about contractual 
choice arising from the theoretical model.  This model is estimated using data from a rice-
growing village in semi-arid tropical India.  The empirical findings, which prove consistent with 
predicted behavior, are compared with other studies of labor contracting systems in South and 
Southeast Asian agriculture. The conclusion summarizes main results.  
Model specification 
Each household is endowed with A units of a collateral asset – owned land for example – and F 
units of available family labor time. The amount of credit available to each household, B is an 
increasing function of the amount of owned land  
( 1 )         B = B(A); B’ > 0.    
The interest rate charged, i, is decreasing in a household’s owned land. 
( 2 )         i = i (A);  i’ < 0.    3
Larger landowners often have greater access to credit at more favorable rates than do smaller 
landowners [Bandhyopadyay; Bhende, 1986; Iqbal; Lipton, 1976]. 
  Each farm household allocates available family labor time F between two sets of activities – 
direct cultivation F and managerial activities, t. The family time constraint is  
( 3 )         F = F + t(N, u). 
The function t(N,u) represents managerial time spent by employers. These employer time costs 
represent recruitment, negotiation, and supervision costs. Each household may hire casual labor 
time N as required during the crop cycle at an exogenously given village wage rate, w.   The 
parameter u represents factors such as unemployment, which influence the time cost of hiring 
casual labor.  Negotiation, recruitment, and supervision costs are decreasing in u, implying that 
transactions costs are higher when labor markets are tight.  This point merits some discussion.  
During periods of peak labor demand, there are congestion externalities as employers compete 
for a limited number of village workers, increasing recruitment costs.  Employers may have to 
resort to recruiting labor outside the village or recruiting less reliable labor within the village.  
Reliance on less able or experienced workers or on workers whose abilities are unknown 
(migrants) requires employers to devote more time to direction and monitoring.  We thus make 
the further specifications 
(4)       tN > 0; tNN > 0; tu < 0; tnu < 0 
where subscripts denote first derivatives and double subscripts denote second derivatives.  The 
transactions costs involved in employing casual labor places an upper bound on the number of 
workers a farm operator can recruit, instruct, and supervise in a given period.    
In a given season, a farm operator’s profits Π on a plot of size A are  
(5)       Π = pQ[A,L] – wN(1 + i(A))   4
where Q is a concave production function and output price is p.  The purchase of casual labor 
time is financed through borrowing at a rate of interest i(A).  The variable L is total labor input 
( 6 )         L = N + F – t(N,u). 
Use of hired labor diverts family time away from direct cultivation activities, F.  These 
transactions costs are unavoidable (i.e. t is determined by the choice of N).  Operated acreage A 
is assumed to be fixed in the short run.  Most intermediate production activities are carried out 
after employers have chosen how much acreage to cultivate.  The variable A may also be taken 
as a technological shift parameter.   
  Consider first an interior solution where neither the family time nor the credit constraints are 
binding and some casual labor is hired.  The optimality condition  
( 7 )         pQL = [w (1 + i(A))] / (1 – tN)  
implies that employers equate the marginal value product of aggregate labor input L to the 
effective marginal cost of hired labor. To employers, the marginal cost of casual labor has two 
components – a constant monetary cost component and an increasing cost in terms of employer 
time. Each additional casual laborer hired diverts family time away from direct cultivation 
activities. Although laborers receive a constant market wage w they are costly in terms of 
employer time. For this reason, a household will not simultaneously hire out family labor for 
agriculture and hire in labor from the casual labor market for the same period or task. The 
marginal cost of labor also depends on the farm operator’s ownership of collateral assets, A, 
which influence interest costs. 
  Roumasset and Smith have noted transaction costs in the labor market act as a progressive 
tax on hired labor use, preventing employers from equating the marginal value product of labor 
to its marginal monetary costs. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.  The upper part of   5
Figure 1 shows the level of hired labor input that solves equation (7).  The marginal cost of hired 
labor [w (1 + i(A))] / (1 – tN) is shown by cc’ while curve mm’ represents the marginal value 
product of aggregate labor input, pQL. 
  The bottom portion of the graph shows the level of family labor devoted to direct production 
and to management as a function of hired labor N.  Aggregate labor input L devoted to direct 
production is given by the distance OB, where OA is hired labor time and AB = OF represents 
family labor time.  The amount of family labor time spent on management equals the distance 
FF.  If transactions costs were eliminated, total labor directly hired would increase to OB* > OB.  
Transactions costs impose a constraint on employment and output on labor-hiring farms.  Time 
costs have an effect analogous to an ad valorem tax on hired labor.  The triangle def represents 
an analogous “deadweight loss” from transactions costs, implying that efficiency gains may be 
obtained by reducing these costs.    
 Inverting,  QL the demand function for hired labor is  
( 8 )         N* = N* (w/p, u, i(A), F). 
The demand for hired labor depends not only on market prices and farm size, but also on 
household endowments of family labor time and collateral assets, as well as factors, u, affecting 
labor market transaction costs. Using N* one can derive a supply function Q
0(w/p, u, A, A, F) and 
a profit function Π 
0(w/p, u, A, A, F).  Both production and profits depend on the distribution of 
productive assets, A and F.   A number of attempts to apply duality theory to more efficiently 
estimate parameters of profit, supply, and input demand equations have often yield disappointing 
results [e.g. Lau and Yotopolous, 1971; Junankar, 1978, 1980a, 1980b; Binswanger and 
Evenson, 1984].  Results have been disappointing in the sense that the null hypothesis of   6
restricted profit maximization is frequently rejected, estimated parameters have the wrong signs, 
or both.  Such problems may stem from biases created by omitting variables such as A, F, or u.   
  The results of comparative static exercises are presented in Table 1 (Detailed calculations are 
available upon request from the author). These results are consistent with Bardhan’s (1984a) 
empirical finding that hired labor demand is related to both landholding and family labor 
availability. An increase in a household’s collateral assets translates into lower credit costs, 
shifting the cc’ curve downward.  In the new equilibrium, more labor is hired and family 
members spend proportionally more time in management activities and will devote less time to 
direct cultivation.  The model has important implications for the impact of internal migration the 
agriculture. The model predicts that out-migration from net hiring households will have a 
negative impact on local employment and output.  If family labor availability F decreases 
because of out-migration, the F(N) curve shifts upward.  In the new equilibrium, the household 
relies increasingly on hired labor (i.e. dN / dF < 0).  However, less family labor is available for 
direct production.  Also, because more casual labor is hired, family labor must be reallocated 
from directly productive activities to managerial ones. Thus, the amount of directly productive 
labor employed declines (i.e. dL / dF < 0) if tNN > 0 as assumed.  This result holds even if the 
agricultural labor supply curve is perfectly elastic with respect to the casual wage rate. Harriss 
(1982) has observed peasant farms that suffered economic losses because there were too few 
family members available to properly recruit and monitor labor.  Lipton (1980) and Connell et al. 
(1976) also cited evidence suggesting that out-migration from employer households has a 
negative effect on local labor demand.  
  The results also have implications for inter-village labor mobility.  If the parameter u is 
interpreted as a measure of mutual familiarity, migrant labor would entail greater transactions   7
costs.  Employers may prefer local labor even if newcomers offered to work at lower monetary 
wage rates. Conversely, laborers may be averse to seeking work in villages with higher 
prevailing market wages than their own because their probability of gaining employment, and 
expected earnings, hence would be lower than the observed market wage.  This results is 
consistent with Rudra’s (1984) empirical finding in West Bengal villages that laborers did not 
migrate to nearby villages where higher wage rates prevailed and employers did not hire labor 
from surrounding villages with lower prevailing wage rates. Rajaraman (1982) also found wide 
wage dispersions in contiguous villages in Karnataka.  
  An increase in operated acres A will cause the marginal productivity of labor curve mm’ to 
shift upward, increasing demand for hired labor as well as the deadweight loss from transactions 
costs.  The variable A may also be taken as a technological shift parameter representing tasks that 
have large labor requirements.  Family labor constraints may thus constrain adoption of more 
labor-intensive crops or technologies.   
Price responsiveness 
Under the general specification employed thus far, it is not clear what the precise effect of 
transactions costs on the price sensitivity of output supply and labor demand will be.  We have, 
however, derived, various elasticities for the special case of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
Q = L
αA
β.  The elasticity of labor demand with respect to output price εp is 
(9)    εp = [ (1 – α) + (L tNN) / (1 – tN)
2 ] 
–1 
With no transaction costs, this elasticity is ε
0
p or  
(10)     ε
0
p = 1 / (1 – α) > εp 
The elasticity of output supply with respect to output price is ηp = α εp. With no transaction costs, 
this elasticity is η
0
p = α / (1 – α) > ηp.  Further, the elasticities ηp and εp will equal zero if either   8
the family labor availability constraint or the credit constraint are binding.  This would be true 
even under a general production function specification.  The elasticity of labor demand with 
respect to the market wage rate εw is  
(11)  εw = {[ (α – 1 ) (1 – tN) ] – [(L tNN) / (1 – tN)
2 ] }
–1 
If hired labor use is high enough for tN to tend toward one, then εw will tend toward zero.  The 
value of εw will tend toward zero if the family labor constraint is binding.  Without transaction 
costs, εw  = 1/(α – 1).   These results imply that with transactions costs and relatively high use of 
hired labor, the demand for hired labor may be highly inelastic.  The computed elasticities for the 
special Cobb-Douglas case are consistent with evidence presented by Junankar (1978; 1980a; 
1980b), Bardhan (1984a) and Binswanger and Evenson (1984), which suggests that the demand 
for labor in Indian agriculture is quite inelastic with respect to output price and the wage rate.  
The Binswanger and Evenson study, estimating labor demand functions from a number of 
regions, found price responsiveness to be smaller in areas where the ratio of hired to family labor 
use was highest.  This is in concert with our theoretical results.   
Implications of the Model 
Model results have important implications in terms of policy and specification of economic 
relationships.  Regarding economic modeling, a standard result of many household models is that 
allocative efficiency is independent of the distribution of endowments (Barnum and Squire; 
Singh, Squire, and Strauss).  Transaction costs and differential credit costs imply that this result 
no longer holds.  This occurs because interest rate dispersion and transactions costs 
systematically depend on asset distribution.  This is particularly important because most 
agricultural production data sets do not include any measures of transaction costs or exact rates 
of interest paid.  Our results suggest that in addition to average market prices, it is necessary to   9
include endowment variables for family size and property ownership in input demand, output 
supply and profit functions of agricultural households. 
  The model also suggest that as hired labor use becomes great relative to family labor 
availability, output supply and labor demand become unresponsive to increases in output price.  
This suggests that there may be little scope for inducing increases in output or employment 
through price support policies.  In the limiting case where the family labor constraint is binding, 
output price increases only direct income transfers to labor-constrained employers.  
Alternatively, reducing the scale of agricultural operations may reduce the deadweight loss from 
transaction costs.  This occurs because the source of inefficiency is the use of hired labor.  As A 
declines, family labor increasingly substitutes for hired labor.  At the limit, the farm operates 
with only family labor and the deadweight loss is zero.  Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) have 
demonstrated that given dual imperfections in the credit and labor markets, breaking down large 
net hiring farms into smaller operations may increase allocative efficiency as well as agricultural 
employment and output.  
Adjustments through induced innovation in labor arrangements 
Employers have an economic incentive to develop new labor arrangements that reduce 
transaction costs. Alternative labor arrangements to the casual market may be understood as 
institutional innovations designed to economize on employer time.  Examples of time-saving 
innovations in labor markets include the creation of markets for managerial labor (Calvo and 
Wellisz) ant the development of incentive contracts such as piece rates (Roumasset and Uy), 
efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz; Bowles) and labor-tying arrangements (Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1985a).  An important feature of these alternatives to the casual market is that they allow 
employers to substitute working capital for employer time.  They represent a shift from personal   10
labor management, which is intensive in family member time, to contractual forms of labor 
management, which entail greater monetary cost, but economize on family member time. 
Contractual innovation may be explained in terms of a tradeoff between the opportunity cost of 
employer time necessary to manage labor and the cost of working capital necessary for monetary 
payments to hired labor.  The induced demand for time-saving contracts will depend, therefore, 
on a household’s endowment of available family labor and factors affecting labor requirements 
such as scale of operation and technology.  In addition the relative monetary costs of different 
labor arrangements will also be important.  The analysis of contracts in terms of tradeoffs 
between employer time and working capital has been carried out by Sen (1981) and Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1985b) who examined the choice between casual labor contracts and land rental 
contracts.  Land rental contracts may not always substitute for different labor contracts.  For 
example, there may be no market for land-rental once the crop production cycle has begun.  
Thus, once employers decide to operate a given holding, they will be constrained to choose from 
among different employment arrangements. 
  The theory of induced institutional innovation (Ruttan and Hayami) implies that there will be 
and economic incentive to develop contracts that substitute for missing or imperfect markets.  In 
addition, contractual arrangements adjust in response to changes in technology and relative 
factor scarcities in a manner analogous to flexible prices in a Walrasian system, allowing 
economic agents to equate relative marginal factor costs to returns.  Given transaction costs in 
labor markets and price distortions in rural credit markets, however, relative factor scarcity will 
be household specific as will relative factor costs.  Small-holding peasant households are 
characterized by relatively large endowments of available family labor relative to owned land.  
For this group, working capital is scarce and smallholders will relay on labor arrangements that   11
require fewer financial resources.  For larger-scale farms, family labor availability for 
recruitment and supervision of labor may become the scarce and limiting factor of production.  
On such farms, there will be an induced demand for labor contracts that economize on family 
member time.  Contractual choice, therefore, cannot be explained without consideration of the 
distribution of productive assets across agents. 
  The approach taken here extends earlier work on induced institutional innovation, which 
focused on the role of relative factor scarcity at a regional or village level.  This limits one’s 
ability to explain the existence of heterogeneous institutional structures in regions with 
homogeneous relative resource endowments.  For example, Hayami and Kikuchi had difficulty 
explaining why, two different types of rice harvesting contracts were developed within a 
geographical contiguous and ecologically homogeneous area.  They were led to explain 
differences in contractual choice in terms of the manner in which the distribution of assets in a 
region influenced the transactions costs of alternative contractual arrangements. This important 
insight, however, was not developed formally.  Moreover, the main explanatory variable – 
transactions costs – was unobserved.  However plausible and intuitive this approach may be in 
describing changes in contractual arrangements ex post, its reliance on unobserved explanatory 
variables severely limits the theory’s verifiability and predictive power.  In the following section, 
a model of endogenous institutional change is developed that may be viewed as an extension of 
earlier theories of induced institutional innovation.   
  The approach develops more formally its micro foundations, taking the household, rather 
than the region or village as the basic unit of analysis.  The significant extensions may be 
summarized as follows. First, problems of imperfect information and collateral requirements 
imply that relative factor scarcities are household specific and incompletely revealed by average   12
relative market prices.  Thus, the structure and mix of contracts in a region depend not only on 
the aggregate level of endowments, but also on the distribution of those endowments across 
households.  Second, transaction costs in labor markets may be evaluated in terms of employer 
time costs.  It is hypothesized that these costs are systematically related to such readily 
observable factors as scale of operation, technology, labor force characteristics and local 
unemployment rates.  The fact that major explanatory variables are observed (or potentially 
observed) makes the proposition of the model amenable to empirical verification.  
  In this section, employers are allowed the option of hiring the services of a labor contractor 
who recruits and organizes work-gang labor for specialized tasks.  Employers can hire C hours of 
work-gang labor on a contract basis at a total cost of Z.  The sum payment Z, is an increasing 
function of the number of laborers require to complete the task in the specified time, Z = Z(C) 
and Z’(C) > 0.  It is assumed that Z(C) is a simple linear function of the form Z = zC, where z is a 
scalar constant.  Examination of village level data revealed that, for a given season-task 
combination, the contract rate, z exceeded the casual hourly rate, w.  The difference z – w may be 
thought of as a per labor hour premium charged for contracting services.  Contract labor is 
assumed to be self-recruiting, but to require some supervision time τ such that τ  = τ(C,u) where 
τC > 0, τCC  = 0 and τu < 0.  It is also assumed that τC < τN for any C = N.  Time cost functions 
for casual and contract labor are shown in Figure 2.   Contract labor economizes on employer 
time but involves higher per unit monetary costs.  The introduction of contracting, however, 
places a ceiling on the effective marginal cost of hired labor.  At sufficiently high levels of hired 
labor use (points to the right of h*) the effective marginal cost of contract labor (which includes 
the opportunity cost of employer time) is less than that for casual labor. Transaction costs under 
contracting may be further reduced if the employer and contractor have a long-standing   13
relationship.  In such cases, the reputation of a contractor may ac as a substitute for gathering 
information about the quality of particular workers.  This captures the tradeoff employers face 
between the opportunity cost of their time and the extra monetary cost of adopting labor 
contracting as a system of management.  
  An employer’s optimization problem involves both a discrete and a continuous choice. The 
discrete choice is whether to adopt labor contracting or to directly hire and manage casual labor.  
Employers adopt labor contracting if it is more profitable to do so.  Employers’ optimization may 
be expressed as a sequential decision process: 
Step 1: max Π with respect to N ( holding C = 0) yielding a profit function Π
0 
Step 2 max Π with respect to C (holding  N = 0) yielding a profit function Π
1 
Step 3: select max [Π
0, Π
1]. 
It is assumed that employers only hire one type of labor for a specific task.  This is consistent 
with observations from the study area.  An employer’s continuous choice is to determine the 
optimal size of the hired work force, along with contractual structure.  
Properties of labor demand under labor contracting 
If labor contracting is adopted the first order condition will be  
(12)  pQL [A, L
1 ] = [z (1 + i(A))] / (1 – τC)  
where L
1 is the optimally chosen amount of production labor employed if contracting is adopted.  
By inverting QL, equation (12) can be expressed as an input demand function for contract labor 
of the form C* = C (z/p, u, A, i(A), F).  Further substitution yields a supply Q
1(z/p, u, A, A, F) 
and a profit function Π 
1(z/p, u, A, A, F). Figure 3 compares the marginal cost of hired labor 
under each system and Figure 4 compares equilibrium solutions under the direct hire and 
contracting systems. Given the specification of the time cost functions t and τ, the marginal cost   14
curve for hired labor under the direct-hire system cuts from below the marginal cost curve for 
hired labor under the contracting system (Figure 3).  For operations, with sufficiently high labor 
requirements,  
(13) (  z / (1 – τC (C*, u))) < ( w / (1 – tN(N*, u))) 
where C* and N* are optimal levels of hired labor under each contractual regime.  If contracting 
is introduced, total employment increases from OB to OB*.  Equilibrium values if contracting 
were adopted will differ from those under the direct hire system as follows: 
(14)   L
1 > L
0;    Q
1 > Q
0;   QA
1 > QA
0;    QL
1 < QL
0 
Under contracting, labor demand and output supply will be more sensitive to changes in output 
price. In fact, assuming employer time cost function is linear under contracting, price elasticities 
under contracting are identical to those under zero transactions costs.   
Determinants of Contractual Choice 
Consider the discrete choice between contract versus casual labor. Let Λ = Π
1 – Π
0 represent the 
net return from adopting labor contracting over the direct-hire system.  Employers adopt 
contracting if and only if Λ > 0.  Some comparative static results are 
(15) d Λ / dA = QA
1 –  QA
0 > 0 
(16) d Λ / dF = QL
1 –  QL
0 < 0 
(17) d Λ / du  = -tu QL
1  –  (-τu)QL
0 < 0  if  |tu|  >  |τu| 
(18) d Λ / dw/p =   (1 + i(A))N* > 0 
(19) d Λ / dz/p =  – (1 + i(A))Z* < 0 
(20) d Λ / dA  = –i’ [ z C* – wN* ] > 0 
These results imply that the relative profitability of adopting labor contracting increases with an 
increase in the tightness of the casual labor market, represented as an increase in w or a decrease   15
in u.  This suggests that labor contracting will be more prevalent for operations performed at 
times of peak labor demand.  Again, if u is a measure of mutual familiarity between employers 
and laborers, one would expect a higher incidence of contracting in areas relying more heavily 
on migrant labor.  Contracting also becomes increasingly profitable as (a) the monetary cost of 
contract labor z/p decreases, (b) a household’s endowment of family labor time F decreases, (c) 
plot size (or land productivity) A increases, and (d) as a household’s ownership of collateral 
assets A increases.    
  On large farms, employers will tend to select contractual or indirect forms of management.  
Their advantageous position with respect to the credit market makes them better able to adopt 
more complex and costly management systems such as contracting.  Small farms, alternatively, 
find credit less available and more costly to attain. For this group, labor-saving innovations such 
as contracting are less suited to their particular needs. Consequently, small farms may continue 
to capitalize on their advantage in the labor market, relying on family members to manage hired 
labor directly.   
  An iso-locus can be shown in endowment space that determines the critical combinations of 
land ownership and family labor endowments that separate adopters of labor contracting from 
non-adopters.  Let A* and F* be those values of household specific endowments that satisfy the 
equation  
(21)      Λ(w/p, z/p, u, A, A, F) = 0. 
Figure 5 depicts this locus of points.  For given values of the exogenous parameters, a household 
on this locus will be indifferent between adopting labor contracting and directly hiring labor.  
From the comparative static results obtained above, it is clear that for all points above Λ* the   16
relative profitability of labor contracting is positive and conversely, it is negative for all points 
below Λ*.   
 The  Λ* locus will shift in response to changes in w/p, z/p, u, and A.  From the comparative 
static results, factors that increase the marginal product of labor will shift the curve out.  
Conversely, an increase in the relative cost of labor contracting through a decrease the 
unemployment rate or an increase in z relative to w will cause the locus to shift in.  These results 
suggest that for a given level of endowments, households are more likely to adopt contracting in 
the context of higher labor productivity and tighter labor markets.   
Econometric Model  
For a given plot, a farmer may either employ contract work-gang labor or directly hire casual 
labor on the spot market.  The profits on the ith plot of the jth employer directly hiring casual 
labor can be written as 




0 represents the determinate portion of the profit function and eij
0 is a stochastic error 
term capturing unobserved factors that affect profits under the direct hire system.  Alternatively, 
profits under the labor contracting system can be written as  




1 represents unobserved factors that affect profits under labor contracting.  Contract 
labor will be employed on a given plot i by employer j if  




0] > 0 
where Λij represents the net gain from adoption.  It is further assumed that Λij may be 
approximated by a first order Taylor series expansion around a point in (w/p, z/p, u, A, A, F) 
space.  Expression (24) may then be written as    17
(25)      Λij = β’xij + νij
 





are normally distributed, νij will also be normally distributed. The dependent variable Λij is, 
however, unobserved. Instead what is observed is the dichotomous contractual choice variable y 
defined by  
(26)      y = 1 if Λij > 0 
        y =  otherwise 
Equation (25) may then be estimated as a probit regression equation where  
(27)   β’xij = β0 + (w/p) β1 + (z/p) β2 + A β3 + A β4+ F β5 + u β6 
the intercept term β0 represents that part of the Taylor’s series approximation involving only the 
point around which the expansion was made.  If the expansion were around the sample means of 
the variables, then β0 would represent information about the average observation.  This 
interpretation allows us to test our hypotheses that the distribution of endowments at the 
householdd level affects contractual choice.  This amounts to an imposition of the restriction β4 = 
β5 = β6 = 0. on equation (27).  The restricted model embodies the null hypothesis where the 
alternative hypothesis is one where contractual choice depends on household specific factor 
scarcity and unemployment. 
Data and study setting  
The econometric model was estimated using data from rice farms in the village of Aurepalle in 
south-central India.  The data come from the village level studies of the International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) for the years 1981/2 – 1984/5.  Data 
included information on contractual choice, plot size, household attributes as well as prevailing 
seasonal wage and unemployment rates operating in the study area.  There were two types of   18
contracting systems operating  in the study area.  The first is extra-village contracting.  Here, 
labor contractors recruit local villagers for work outside the village such as public works jobs or 
agricultural operations in other areas.  Villagers in dryland areas prove to be a cheap reserve of 
labor for recruiters from more heavily irrigated areas.  Breman (1985) has discussed the 
importance of this type of extra-village contracting of migrant labor in the harvest of sugar cane 
in Gujarat. The other form of contracting is intra-village contracting.  Here, local village 
contractors recruit members of small contract gangs to perform specialized tasks.  Data were 
available only for this type of contracting.  Intra-village labor contracting has been observed in 
other rice-growing regions of South India,  Sri Lanka, and the Philippines.  In Aurepalle, there 
were four female work-gangs specializing in two operations: transplanting and weeding of paddy 
rice.  Each work-gang had between 15-30 members with one female group leader known as a 
peddamanishi.  The group leader, accompanied by three or four work gang members visited rice 
growers to negotiate job contracts.  Work-gangs were paid a collective piece rate based on the 
number of laborers required  to complete the given task in a pre-specified period of time. The 
level of payment may also be partially determined by prevailing field conditions and task 
difficulty.  The payment received by the work gang was shared equally among its members. In 
Aurepalle, the group leader did not receive additional payments for her services, but the group as 
a whole earned a higher wage than the casual rate.  This equal sharing of contract payments has 
also been observed by Athreya et al. on rice farms in Tamil Nadu. Epstein (1973) and Hayami 
and Kikuchi, however, noted cases where the contract group leader was paid a premium above 
payments to other workers.  The group leader’s main function appeared to be bargaining with 
prospective employers and allocating contract work among members of the work-gang.  Not all 
tasks require the full participation of all members at a given time.  The group leader   19
coordinatedthe timing and deployment of work-gang labor across different employers and fields.  
For a given job, the group leader and employer jointly determined the size of the labor force.  
The group leader is also responsible for settling any internal disputes among work-gang 
members.  The effective cost per hour of contract labor is higher than the casual daily wage rate 
for female labor.  Contract labor however is self-recruiting.  In Aurepalle, the group leader was 
not responsible for supervision of the work-gang. Interviews with rice growers revealed that they 
felt that their personal supervision was necessary to guarantee work quality.  Employers reported 
that the main reason for using contract labor was to economize on recruitment costs and to 
reduce risk of production delays.  
  Aurepalle experienced a tightening of its agricultural labor market since the 1970s.  This has 
occurred despite continued population growth, lack of any significant technological change that 
might increase labor demand, and reduction in irrigated acreage as a consequence of recent 
drought and groundwater scarcity.  Many factors acted to shift the supply curve for agricultural 
labor inward (ICRISAT, 1987).  First, many formerly landless labor households received grants 
of previously government-held grazing land.  Agricultural labor households diversified into other 
activities such as herding animals or tapping palm trees.  There was also increased migration to 
Hyderabad 70 kilometers away to work in the urban informal sector as well as an expansion of 
alternative income-generating activities developed through Integrated Rural Development 
Programs (IRDPs) in the village. In addition, some agricultural labor households were able to 
purchase cropland outright.  This combination of factors led to a secular decline in 
unemployment and increase in real agricultural wages (ICRISAT, 1987). 
  Data on employment of casual and contract labor by task for the South Indian village of 
Aurepalle were available for the crop years 1981/2 – 1984/5.  During this period, contract labor   20
employment was concentrated almost exclusively in paddy rice transplanting and weeding.  
Returns to task performance are sensitive to the speed and timeliness of task completion.  Delays 
in transplanting seedlings from nursery beds to fields once they have reached maturity may 
severely reduce yields. Yields are also sensitive to the timing of fertilizer applications.  Weeding, 
if necessary is performed between transplanting and fertilizer applications.  Thus, both 
operations require that relatively large amount of labor be mobilized in a relatively short time 
horizon. These tasks represent cases where family labor time constraints are more likely to be 
binding and where marginal recruitment and monitoring costs are likely to be higher.  It is not 
surprising that contract labor specializes in these tasks.  Use of contract labor has been observed 
in other rice-growing areas of India (Athreya et al.; Epstein 1962, 1973), in the Philippines 
(Hayami and Kikuchi) and Indonesia (Hart, 1980).  Problems of mobilizing sufficient labor are 
particularly acute for rabi season transplanting of paddy from late November to early December. 
This is a time when the villages major kharif season crops – sorghum, pearl millet, and castor – 
are harvested.  This is usually a time when labor availability in the village is lowest and wage 
rates are highest (Ryan and Ghodake). 
  A total of 75 complete observations were available for plots on which weeding was 
performed and 164 observations were available for transplanting.  The observations were for rice 
farmers choosing between casual and contract hired labor. One farm in one year that employed 
only family labor was excluded from the sample.  Tables 1 and 2 compare adoption rates of labor 
contracting in the base and final years of observation.  For transplanting, adoption rates between 
large and small-to- medium farms are compared.  The year 1984 was a relatively dry year with 
lower than average agricultural employment.  Weeding was almost exclusively carried out by the 
large farm group.  Table 1 shows that large farms have a higher rate of adoption.     21
Estimation results 
Tables 3 and 4 report results of regression estimation for weeding and transplanting.  The 
variable PMU – the probability of market unemployment – is the ratio of days an agricultural 
laborer fails to find employment to the total number of days which she sought employment.  The 
reference period is the month during which the given operation was performed.  One would 
expect the incidence of contracting to be inversely related to this variable as a tighter labor 
market implies greater recruitment costs.  The probability that contract labor is employed is 
greater for households with more owned land (OWN), on larger plots (AREA) and have lower 
levels of available family labor (AVAIL).  The variable AVAIL includes both family members and 
regular farm servants employed annually by the household.  Adoption of contracting is 
negatively associated with its monetary cost and positively associated with the casual wage rate, 
though only marginally for transplanting.  The coefficient of the variable PMU meant to capture 
the effect of market unemployment on transaction costs has the expected negative sign in both 
equations, but is significant only for the transplanting  equation.  This result may be due to the 
fact that only monthly measures of unemployment were available for the village.  Weeding 
operations are often performed in the end of January when the labor market has slackened.  All 
the coefficients have the signs expected from the theoretical model.  The hypothesis that 
contractual choice depends solely on technology / plot size, relative monetary prices and average 
relative factor scarcity (β4 = β5 =  β6 = 0) was rejected at the 2.5% significance level using a 
likelihood ratio test for weeding.  The likelihood test statistic equaled 10.16 with 3 degrees of 
freedom.  The same hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level for transplanting – the likelihood 
ratio statistic was 12.81 with 3 degrees of freedom.  For weeding, the model correctly predicted 
contractual choice over 66% of the time, while the percentage correct for transplanting was 74%.    22
Comparison with other studies 
The results are in line with observations made by Hart (1980) of Indonesian rice-growing areas 
who found nearly all recruitment and organization of transplanting operations were carried out 
by local female contractors.  For weeding operations, the incidence of direct hiring was greater 
(as in this study) but “larger landowners delegated recruitment.”  The theoretical results of the 
model are also consistent with the observations of Rao (1984) of a Karnataka village originally 
studied by Epstein, 1973.  Rao (1984) found a declining incidence of labor contracting in rice 
cultivation accompanying  a general slackening of the agricultural labor market and a secular 
reduction in the numebr of households owning more than one acre or more of irrigated land.  
  Managerial innovations remove a number of constraints on the profitability of large-scale 
farming in Indian agriculture.  It has been noted that Green Revolution technological packages 
often generated sharp peaks in labor demand (Ghodake, Ryan, and Sarin; Bardhan; Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig)  The new technology requires large amounts of labor to perform certain tasks 
over a specific, short time horizon.  Such technology may create labor bottlenecks by driving up 
the wage rates in times of short-term labor scarcity.  Adoption of new labor-intensive 
technologies may be hindered by constraints on available family labor.  Labor contracting, 
however, lowers the marginal cost of hired labor.  We also notate that imperfect information may 
restrict inter-village labor mobility.  Contractors, by acting as guarantors of the performance of 
their work-gang reduce the importance of mutual familiarity between employers and individual 
laborers.  Thus, labor contracting complements the adoption of more labor intensive practices on 
large farms employing migrant labor.  Labor contracting systems employing large amounts of 
migrant labor predominate in sugar growing regions of Gujarat (Breman; Attwood).  The 
introduction of sugar growing in the area led to a high degree of labor intensification.  Labor   23
contracting with migrant labor has also been observed in areas of rapid adoption of Green 
Revolution technologies (Bhalla, 1976; Rao, 1975). 
  Both the theoretical and empirical results indicate that contracting appears to be more 
favored by larger farms.  This observation has been made elsewhere with respect to sugar 
harvesting (Attwood; Roumasset and Uy) and rice cultivation (Athreya et al.; Hart) and more 
generally (Breman). Results also suggest that the incidence of labor contracting increases with a 
tightening of the rural labor market.  Roumasset and Uy also found a positive correlation 
between agricultural wage rates and the use of contractors.   
Conclusions 
To summarize, the study explains labor contracting in agriculture as a means of overcoming 
constraints imposed by transaction costs.  Information and other transaction costs implies that 
hired labor is an imperfect substitute for family labor, but small farms face higher credit costs, 
tighter credit constraints, or both.  Larger-scale producers hold a cost advantage in the credit 
market, but small farms, relying predominantly on family labor, hold a cost advantage in the 
labor market.  
  Larger-scale production is constrained by family labor availability.  A simple model was 
developed that characterizes use of labor contractors as an institutional innovation that allows 
larger-scale employers to substitute (relatively) cheaper working capital for scarce time.  
Econometric analysis yields results in general agreement with the theoretical model of labor 
contract choice.  One implication of the results, beyond the scope of the present study, is that 
growth of labor contracting may facilitate the increase in the scale operation in Indian agriculture 
and agriculture elsewhere in the developing world.       24
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Table 1. Impact of exogenous parameter changes on employment, output, and profits 
Parameter changed  Variable 
Affected  A A F w u p 
        
F  – – + + ? – 
N   + + – – ? + 
L  + + + – + + 
Q  + + + – + + 




Table 2. Comparison of labor contracting adoption rates for paddy rice transplanting 
 1981/2  1984/5 
    
Percent of plots using contracting  55  77 
Large farms  71  92 
Medium/small farms  15  40 
    






Large farms  70  95 




Table 3. Comparison of labor contracting adoption rates for paddy rice weeding 
 1981/2  1984/5 
    
Percent of plots using contracting  41  62 
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Table 4. Probit regression of factors affecting use of labor contracting for weeding 
operations on Aurepalle rice plots  
Dependent variable y = 1 if contract labor employed (46 observations);  
                                y = 0 otherwise (29 observations)  
     
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 





     
AREA  0.99635   *     2.07  1.146  0.646 
OWN  0.10833   *     2.49  11.628  8.787 
AVAIL  -0.32461 *     -2.07  5.146  2/197 
WWAGE  4.01340       **     1.77  0.481  0.121 
WCON  -3.02430       **   -1.77  0.622  0.177 
PMU  -0.00933 -0.38  15.605  8.160 
Constant -0.12752  -0.11     
     
75 observations  
Likelihood ratio test (zero slopes) 19.85 with 6 d.f. 
Percent correctly predicted: 66.67 
* significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 10% level  
  
Glossary of Variables   
  
AREA  Size of plot in hectares 
OWN  Owned land in hectares  
AVAIL  Number of available family members 
WWAGE  Average village casual real wage rate (female), weeding  
WCON  Average village real contract rate (female), weeding 
PMU  Probability of market unemployment for reference period – 
number of days laborers were unable to find work divided by 
the total number of days work was sought (multiplied by 100)  
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Table 5. Probit regression of factors affecting use of labor contracting for transplanting 
operations on Aurepalle rice plots  
Dependent variable y = 1 if contract labor employed (108 observations);  
                                y = 0 otherwise (56 observations)  
     
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 





     
AREA  0.99987 *  3.6157 1.088  0.583 
OWN  0.04206   * 2.6762  11.898  8.851 
AVAIL  -0.10393   **-2.4181  3.853  4.022 
TWAGE  1.17080 1.1443  0.456 0.117 
TCON  -2.32970 -1.5299  0.642  0.087 
PMU  -0.04538   *-2.7711 16.490  7.867 
Constant 1.02270 1.0077     
     
164 observations  
Likelihood ratio test (zero slopes) 33.38 with 6 d.f. 
Percent correctly predicted: 74.4 
* significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level  
  
Glossary of Variables   
  
AREA  Size of plot in hectares 
OWN  Owned land in hectares  
AVAIL  Number of available family members 
TWAGE  Average village casual real wage rate (female), transplanting 
TCON  Average village real contract rate (female), transplanting  
PMU  Probability of market unemployment for reference period – 
number of days laborers were unable to find work divided by 
the total number of days work was sought (multiplied by 100)  
  
   31


















w (1 + i(A))  
F = F – t(N,u)     32

























t(N,u)   
τ(C,u)  
Employer time   
N , C     33
Figure 3. Marginal cost of hired labor under contracting and direct hiring 
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